>By

Mark James Sokol

Bibliography

"For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand." These are the words of Anselm of Canterbury from his "Proslogion." Anselm hoped not to have a complete understanding of God, only a little, because he felt that it was impossible to do otherwise. He first believed in God in hopes that a limited understanding of God would follow. Faith and reason, or understanding, are distinct here in the 12^th century. This gap was not new to this era, however. Sextus Epiricus in the 2^nd century ruled out the existence of faith by his skeptic and rational views. For centuries the distinction between faith and reason was disjunctive; one either appealed to faith, or was a heathen and appealed to reason. This view could not stand as the Renaissance came to be. Human intellect was exercised in ways that expanded the rational capacities. New thoughts and ideas emerged. Science became a field that was no longer considered blasphemous. Philosophers and scientists alike were developing new freedom from the fear of exile for expressing their views. The tables turned and now faith was becoming smaller and reason or scientific discovery was the new truth. In the 18^th and 19^th centuries these thoughts flourished. God seemed to be dead.

God was dead because God had been rationalized so much that he could no longer exist. God had been shown not to exist. This is the essential problem. In a rational world, or at least a world confined to rational thought, it is difficult for God to exist because the concept of God cannot easily be rationalized. There are concepts in the world other than rationality. These concepts are of faith and belief, mysticism and things beyond empirical description. It is in these places that God will be found. The differences of faith and reason do not rule out the possibility of the existence of God. These differences complement each other, and allow for something unexplainable to at least be understood at a simplistic level.

My purpose for this work is to expose the problem of reason versus faith as it relates to religious belief. As a devout Christian, and a dedicated philosopher, I have experienced difficulty in rationalizing that which I believe in. This project is a culmination of 8 years of thought and study on this issue. I have lain awake many a night wondering how to justify that which I believe in the face of reason, logical rationalization, and a multitude of doubts. I feel that I can have faith in God and still seek rational justification for that belief. My frustration came when I ran into roadblocks that contradicted this thought. The idea that God cannot exist in a rational world and the apparent refutation of God’s very essence made me realize that my belief in God may never be rationalized. It was at that moment that I decided that my faith was stronger than the reason and logic presented against it. However, I could not ignore my rational passions. I still believe that rational, logical support for my faith may be found. This belief has lead me to discover fideism. I can have faith and seek rational justification. In the Western world of ‘either, or,’ it is often difficult to see that ‘both’ can be accepted.

In the first chapter of this paper, I will present some basic definitions of the concepts of epistemology and faith. I will demonstrate that using these definitions, it can be argued that faith can lead to knowledge. The purpose of the exercise is not to prove that faith can replace reason, but to show that faith can complement reason. In the second chapter, I explore the history of the faith vs. reason debate, and I show the roots of the concept of fideism. In the final chapter, I draw the conclusion that fideism is a justifiable approach to religious thought.

It is my hope that after reading this work, one may come to realize that even in the face of complete doubt and rational deconstruction, religious belief may still be a justifiable endeavor. The world of religious belief is not just a place for those irrational minds that seek truth based upon blind faith. It is a world where the rational philosopher may find a home and where that philosopher may peacefully coexist with others not so intellectually inclined.

In the face of reason and logical thought, religious belief has faced adversity. Fideism has been a response to such onslaught, but is it a surrender to a battle that cannot be won, or is it an intelligent response by those who are faithful but who do not want to abandon rational thought? I will argue the latter. Fideism is the claim that religious belief is based on faith rather than reason. There are two kinds of fideism, extreme fideism which holds that faith is contradictory to reason, and moderate fideism which holds that what is first accepted by faith may subsequently find rational support. I support the moderate view. To continue this discussion, the definitions of a few terms must be clarified. These are "knowledge," "belief," "faith," "reason," and "rational thought".

Belief is a mental state, often thought of as the primary cognitive state. Beliefs are subsets of propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude is an attitude to a proposition. A proposition is an abstract entity expressed in natural language. An example of a proposition is, "It is raining." It may or may not be raining, but I may believe that it is raining. Belief is representational and controls behavior. If I believe that it is raining, I may pick up an umbrella before I go outside. This is behavior as a result of a belief. If I believe that it is raining because I saw a weather report that had a symbol of a cloud with rain, then my belief is a result of a representation of rain. My belief that it is raining and my behavior of picking up an umbrella represent my desire to want to stay dry. Propositional content of beliefs can be identical in individuals, but not necessarily beliefs themselves. For instance, I may watch the same weather report that my neighbor watches. We both have received the message that it is raining. The weather reports we watch are identical. I may choose to believe the report, and my neighbor may choose not to believe the report. The propositional content of our beliefs is the same, but the beliefs themselves are not because I believe that it is raining and my neighbor does not.

Knowledge is that set of beliefs which are true and for which we can give justification. Justified, true belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. If I know something, I must believe that it is true. Further, I must be able to give justification for the truth of my belief. If I believe that it is raining, I do not necessarily know that it is raining until I go outside and verify it by feeling the wet raindrops on my head (assuming I forgot my umbrella.) Only when I have justified my belief do I know that what I believe is true. Justification of a belief is not always contingent upon empirical proof. Knowledge is either a priori or a posteriori. A priori knowledge is knowledge that requires no experience. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that requires experience. My knowledge that 2 + 2 = 4 is verifiable simply by taking two oranges and combining them with two more oranges and counting the total amount of oranges I have. This is an example of a posteriori knowledge. I also know that water consists of H₂0 molecules. I have not verified this to be true, and I do not need to. I know that it is true based on the discoveries of others and the trust I place in them to relay the truth about their discovery. This form of knowledge, a priori knowledge, is more subjective than a posteriori knowledge. A priori knowledge may depend more on trusting that a belief is true than the actual verifiability of the truth claim. Foundationalists maintain that some beliefs are basic, and need no further justification. These beliefs are a priori cases of knowledge. These beliefs serve as the foundation for other beliefs. It is this foundation of truth that allows for knowledge. The theory of foundationalism eliminates the possibility of an infinite cycle of justification for truth. What I mean by an infinite cycle of justification is the following. My belief in x depends on some premise y, where y is justifiable, for my belief to be justified. If I believe x, it is raining, then I can justify my belief by y, water droplets are falling from the sky. I can easily justify y because I can empirically verify y. If, however, I base my belief on y₁, the weatherman reported that it is raining, then I need further justification for y_1. I would need a claim y₂ that justifies y₁. An infinite regress of justification would require a justifiable claim for every claim made, including the empirically verifiable claims like y, water droplets are falling on my head. I could have y_n+¥ reasons for a belief and still never have a justified belief. My beliefs may never be wholly justified, because I may not find enough justification for one belief to hold that the beliefs that it supports are not false. If this is the case, then knowledge may never be attained, since knowledge is dependent upon justifiable belief. Ernest Sosa argues, "The regress argument in epistemology concludes that we must countenance beliefs that are justified in the absence of justification by other beliefs. It reaches that conclusion only by rejecting the possibility in principle of an infinite regress of justification. It thus opts for foundational beliefs justified in some noninferential way by ruling out a chain or pyramid of justification that has justifiers, and justifiers of justifiers, and so on without end." Foundationalism allows for the justification of belief and stops the regress before it goes ad infinitum.

The relationship then between belief and knowledge is the following. Knowledge supervenes upon belief. That is to say belief does not entail knowledge, but it is impossible for knowledge to change without a change in belief. Beliefs must be either justifiable or foundational in order to be held as truth. Only justified or foundational belief can be sustained as true. In other words, true, justified belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, and beliefs can be justified either empirically or foundationally.

The relationship between knowledge and belief has been shown, but what of the relationship between faith and belief? Faith is conviction in a belief or a set of beliefs. Faith is similar to knowledge in that faith supervenes upon belief. That is to say belief does not entail faith, but it is impossible for faith to change without a change in belief. Beliefs must be justifiable in order to be held as truth for knowledge. Belief for faith need not be verifiably justifiable. I may believe that it is raining because the weatherman told me it is raining. If I believe the weatherman without verification, I have placed faith in his claim. Likewise, if a scientist tells me that water is composed of H₂O molecules, and I believe her without trying to find proof on my own, then I have placed faith in that scientist and in the claim that water is made up of H₂O molecules. Faith, then, is dependent upon belief. Beliefs do not need to be verified as truthful in order for faith to be justified. The simple acceptance of a belief as true and not the actual verification of its truth can justify faith. The foundationalist idea that some beliefs are basic and need no further justification is an underlying precept for faith.

There are two connotations of the word "reason." Beliefs and other mental states function as reasons for actions. In this context, reason can be defined as a cause, motive or purpose. In the more abstruse sense, reason is the faculty of thinking and the power of understanding. The general human capacity for truth seeking and problem solving is reason. Reason is claimed by some as the defining characteristic of human beings. Our ability to think rationally is based on our ability to reason. Thinking rationally entails the ability to think about things that have not been observed and may be unobservable entirely. Such things as atoms, black holes, mathematical concepts (like 2 + 2 = 4), and God are things we can think about without ever experiencing them empirically. Reason is the tool by which we empirically justify beliefs. It is also the tool by which we can assume some beliefs to be foundational. Can we reason that a belief is a foundational and therefore justifiable belief? Can such concepts as faith, lead to justified beliefs? If so, then faith could lead to knowledge since true justified belief is a necessary condition for knowledge.

I have shown that beliefs are rudimentary. True, justifiable or foundational belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. Belief, not necessarily verifiable, justifiable belief, is a necessary and sufficient condition for faith. This belief, however, can be negated by empirical evidence to the contrary. Reason is the tool by which beliefs are justified.

Fideism is the claim that religious belief is based on faith rather than reason. There are two veins of thought in a fideist camp. The extremist view is that faith is completely contradictory to reason. The major focus of this claim is that things that are commonly accepted on faith cannot be accepted based on reason. Something that cannot be empirically verified is usually the target of such a petition. The existence of God has long been argued for and against. An extreme fideist would assert that God’s existence simply cannot be rationalized, and no attempt should even be made. The moderate view holds that what is first accepted by faith may subsequently find rational support. Hence, the existence of God must be accepted primarily on the grounds of faith, but that belief may subsequently be found to have a rational basis. The intention is not to reasonably justify the belief first, but to have the belief first and then search for justification. If no justification is found, nothing is lost, because the belief still holds. The belief would be foundational and would need no justification.

Reason is sufficient for justification of belief. Is faith sufficient for justification of belief? As stated earlier, faith is conviction in a belief or a set of beliefs. True, justifiable or foundational belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. If it can be accepted that faith is sufficient for foundational beliefs to hold, then it can be shown that faith is sufficient for knowledge. There are some beliefs that are foundational and need no justification. Consider this example. Can I know that quarks exist based only on my faith that they exist? If so, then faith that they exist would be sufficient for knowledge that they exist; and by this example, faith would be sufficient for knowledge. I must have faith that they exist. I cannot see quarks. I have personally witnessed no experiments that prove that quarks exist. No one has observed an actual quark; only its effects on other particles. I have faith that quarks exist. I choose to believe that "quarks exist" is a true statement and I have therefore conviction (or faith) that the belief in quarks is true. My belief is not based on any sort of empirical evidence. Scientists do experiments on quarks, and report their results. These scientists help confirm my belief in quarks. One scientific experiment is not enough to justify the existence of quarks. My faith that quarks exist is enough to justify to me that they do indeed exist. I, as others do, make the claim that I know that quarks exist. This claim is based not on any directly verifiable evidence, but simply on conviction that the evidence that does exist for quarks, although not verifiable by me, is true. From this I conclude that faith is a sufficient condition for foundational belief. It has been argued that faith may not be a sufficient condition for foundational belief on the grounds that a distinction must be made between having faith in testimony for which there is supporting empirical knowledge and having faith in testimony for which there is no supporting empirical knowledge. From this, the following argument could be made: if I were to claim that I believe in God based solely on the testimony of theological experts, I would not be able to claim that my belief in God is a justified belief. My counter to this argument is, foundational beliefs require no empirical support and because of that, I could have justified belief based solely on the testimony of another person. If I claim that my faith in my belief is justification for that belief, and I base my faith not only on the testimony of experts, but also on the foundational status of that belief, then I can claim to have a justified belief. C. Coady says, "our trust in the word of others is fundamental to the very idea of serious cognitive activity." The distinction lies between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. A good example of non-empirical knowledge is my knowledge of infinity. The concept of infinity is not empirically verifiable. I have faith that my belief in infinity is true, and that belief is so justified. It is important that I make clear a distinction here between faith as understood as religious belief and faith as used in the above examples as the faculty of accepting beliefs on very little or even no supporting evidence. I shall refer to the latter definition for the entirety of this chapter. Traditionally, true, justifiable or foundational belief has been a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge. Since it is possible that faith can be sufficient for foundational beliefs, then faith can be sufficient for knowledge by the law of transitivity. Stated more clearly:

P1: It is possible that faith is a sufficient condition for justifying true belief.

P2: Justifiable, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

C: It is possible that faith is a sufficient condition for knowledge.

(This conclusion is subject to empirical disconfirmation.)

In General: P1: It is possible that P à Q

P2: Q à R

I shall refer to the above law as the faith-transitive principle of epistemology. A second conclusion can be drawn from this principle; that is that faith in God’s existence is reasonable. I have shown that faith can be sufficient for arriving at knowledge because faith can justify belief. I have also shown that reason is the tool that allows for justification of belief, and that true, justified belief is both necessary and sufficient for arriving at knowledge. There are two different paths to one destination. The road of faith seems to lead to knowledge just as the road of reason does. What then becomes of the debate of faith and reason? Can these two choices, independent of one another, lead to knowledge and truth? I suggest that they can and further, that these two paths can complement each other and lead to an even more stable foundation for knowledge and truth.

In chapter 2, I will examine the historical development of the faith-reason debate and show how the trend in contemporary philosophy can slowly bring us back to the moderate fideistic approach to reasonably justifying faith as it applies to religious belief. In chapter 3, I will reconcile faith and reason and show that together they can allow for a more solid foundation for knowledge; since I have shown in this chapter that both faith and reason can independently lead to knowledge.

The distinction between the two paths to knowledge, faith and reason, can be historically traced. For most of philosophy, the concept of faith has applied to religious belief. Faith is the tool in which non-empirically verifiable beliefs are justified. One of the most talked about, debated and known non-empirically verifiable beliefs is a belief in God. It is to religious belief that fideism is applied. It is also religious concepts and the debates about them that have lead to the development of a split between faith and reason. By examining the essence of these debates, the nature of the faith-reason split will become apparent.

In the Middle Ages, great thinkers such as Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas came up with brilliant proofs for the existence of God. These proofs follow analytic, logical structures. Reason as the faculty of thinking and rational thought are used to show God’s existence. Faith, at least blind faith, seems not to be an issue. Anselm said that he had faith first and then proceeded to understanding. "For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand." Phrased differently Anselm’s words are like this, "I do not reason so I may have faith, but I have faith first and then seek reason." Anselm was a moderate fideist. Faith and reason for him were not in conflict.

Anselm’s explanation of and also his proof for the existence of God is that God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived. Anselm first draws us to a distinction between what exists in the mind and what exists in reality by the following analogy. A painter conceives of a painting in his mind and so in his mind, the painting exists. The painting does not exist in reality because the painter has not yet painted it. When he does paint it, the painting will exist in reality. Anselm goes on to say that when someone understands the phrase "that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived," then it exists in the mind. This is because Anselm equates understanding something as existing in the mind. An existence in reality is greater than an existence in the mind, and since "that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived" by definition entails that nothing greater than it can exist, then "that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived" must also exist in reality. This simple logical exercise has employed reason to help justify a belief Anselm has already justified by faith. Reason and faith here are not in conflict; they are working together to strengthen his belief in God. This is precisely what Anselm intended to do. His ontological argument, so named by Kant, is what Anselm felt was a necessary reason for the justification of his faith.

Thomas Aquinas noted that there is no conflict, but faith outweighs reason. His response to claims that reason contradicts faith goes as follows: The "sensible world" is not to be understood as deficient when compared to the spiritual realm; it is to be understood as a part of that that adds insight and includes its own causes and powers. "such powers include man’s natural reason, which is adequate for the knowledge of natural essences and certain truths deducible from them such as the existence of God." Aquinas concluded that sometimes reasoning errs and there are some questions that "are thus undecideable by natural reason." It is in these situations that Aquinas made an appeal to faith.

In the Second and Third Articles of Part One, Question II, "The Existence of God," in the Summa Theologica, Aquinas shows the reason why he puts forth five proofs for the existence of God. The first "objection" that he replies to is that "what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge, whereas faith is of the unseen…therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists." The phrase, "faith is of the unseen" alludes to my earlier definition of faith as the faculty of accepting beliefs on very little or even no supporting evidence. Aquinas believed that the existence of God could be shown because although God’s existence is not self-evident to us, it can be demonstrated by the effects of reason. Aquinas’ direct reply to the above objection is this, "The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge,… Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man from accepting as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated." Aquinas here points out that that which can be known by reason can also be known by faith. This supports my earlier claim that faith and reason can both lead to knowledge. The added italics indicate the importance of the statement that faith assumes knowledge. For Aquinas, to have faith in something was to assume that it is knowable. The coexistence of faith and reason provided no problem for Aquinas as his moderate fideistic persuasion was made apparent.

The mainstream Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages such as Anselm and Aquinas were typically moderate fideists who saw no contradiction in faith and reason. Also in this class fell the Secular Aristotelians like Siger of Brabant. He wrote mostly on philosophical issues without a theological bent. He was a professed Christian, but subscribed to a theory of "double truth" which allowed for the contradiction of philosophic and Christian teachings. When the contradiction was too much to overcome, reason was always inadequate and faith prevailed. The fideists were not limited to Christian philosophers; Moses Maimonides was a Jewish philosopher "who made a sincere effort to harmonize scriptural and philosophical teachings." There were a handful of philosophers and theologians of the time who opposed all elements of reason and were extreme fideists; such as the Muslim Algazali, the Christian Bonaventure and certain leaders of the Roman Catholic Church, specifically, Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris. He was the author of the Condemnation of 1277.

The Condemnation of 1277 was a compilation of propositions put forth by various philosophers of the time that were considered to contravene the doctrines of Christianity. These propositions were officially condemned by the Roman Catholic Church. "For they [the philosophers] say that these things are true according to philosophy but not according to the Catholic faith, as if there were two contrary truths and as if the truth of Sacred Scripture were contradicted by the truth in the sayings of these accursed pagans." Included in the propositions were a number of articles from Thomas Aquinas, including, "That the will necessarily pursues what is firmly held by reason, and that it cannot abstain from that which reason dictates. This necessitation, however, is not compulsion but the nature of the will." The articles condemned were largely those that appealed to reason instead of faith. As a result of the condemnation of 1277, the scholastic efforts of philosophy were severely curtailed, and the authority of Scripture, and thus the Catholic Church, remained unopposed. This move effectively restricted the thoughts of the moderate fideists and rationalists of the time. The battle between faith and reason was underway.

The revocation of Aquinas’ entries in this condemnation in 1325 opened the floodgates and slowly, new thoughts of the Renaissance were soon to flow. In the early 1400s in Toulouse, a Catalan by the name of Raymond Sebond wrote "Natural Theology." Sebond claimed that without what he called "illumination" reason could understand nothing fundamental about the universe. According to Sebond, there are two books of importance, the Book of Nature, and the Book of Holy Writ. The Book of Nature reveals facts about the way the universe is. For Sebond, the Book of Nature is reason. Man cannot wholly know this book of Nature, although it is common to all, because of his fallen nature. To fully understand the Book of Nature, man needs the Book of Holy Writ, a book that is supernatural, and one that is the vehicle for faith. For Sebond, in order for man to fully understand nature by reason he must also have faith. Sebond wrote "Natural Theology" which "was a quintessence distilled from Thomas Aquinas" and was "to establish against the atheists and to show by human, natural reasons the truth of all the articles of the Christian religion." Michel De Montaigne, a French gentleman and scholar in the 1500s, defended this work because he found Sebond to be tremendously successful in his endeavor. Montaigne defended the book against claims such as the following: "Christians do themselves wrong by wishing to support their belief by human reasons: belief is grasped only by faith and private inspiration from God’s grace." This claim, extremely fideistic in nature, is precisely what Montaigne argued against. Montaigne held a moderate fideistic position, that of Sebond, and Aquinas: "We can only grasp Truth if God favors us with the privilege of further help, beyond the natural order." Reason is not ruled out, and it can be used to support religious belief. Montaigne’s point, and that of the moderate fideist is this: faith comes first, and rational support may or may not follow. If rational support follows, the strength of religious belief is not diminished; on the contrary it is intensified. "There is no task, no design, more worthy of a Christian than to aim, by assiduous reflection, at beautifying, developing, and clarifying the truth of his beliefs…we must accompany our faith with all the reason that lies within us."

During the time of the Renaissance, the rational thinkers emerged. The insights of the ancient philosophers were brought back into light. Plato and Aristotle were studied with new interest. A more important aspect of the Renaissance was a new apparent freedom allowed for philosophers. The Church loosened its grip on free thinkers. No longer was there as great a threat of exile or execution for speaking against the existence of God, or more basically against the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church. With the reigns let loose, philosophers began to use rational thought and their reasonable capacities to find the weaknesses in the seemingly bulletproof arguments for the existence of God. Some showed that God’s existence could not be shown through reason at all. This was new ground. Because it was new ground, philosophers broke it with vigor. David Hume entered the scene in the early 18^th. Hume, in The Natural History of Religion, set out to answer the question, "Why is religion so common in the world?" Many philosophers have read Hume as an atheist. Those philosophers must be careful in their assessment. A careful reading of Hume will reveal a definite belief in some greater power. "A purpose, an intention, a design is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author." Hume believed in God. He also believed that religion, a creation of humankind, is an inadequate way to reveal God. This point is where Hume is often misread. Because he discredited religion does not mean that he was an atheist. "How the deity is disfigured by our representations of him!" Hume believed that human reason, the author of religion, falls short of explaining the enigma of the deity. Because reason falls short, the enigma must be realized by faith. Hume was not an atheist, clearly. He simply pointed out how human understanding falls so pitifully short of realizing the true essence of the deity. This shortfall is expressed in the diversity of the major religions of the world. "The universal propensity to believe in the invisible intelligent power, may be considered as a kind of mark which the divine workman has set upon his work." The mere existence of religion implies that there is a deity who wants to be known in some way. David Hume was a fideist. He acknowledged the importance of faith, and allowed for the further justification of that faith based in reason. When quoting Lord Bacon, Hume said, "A little philosophy makes men atheists: A great deal reconciles them to religion." He then went on to say for himself,

For men, being taught, by superstitious prejudices, to lay the stress on a wrong place; when that fails them, and they discover, by a little reflection, that the course of nature is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to ruin. But being taught, by more reflection, that this very regularity and uniformity is the strongest proof of design and of supreme intelligence, they return to that belief, which they had deserted; and they are now able to establish it on a firmer and more durable foundation.

This statement most beautifully states my contention that reason can add justification to faith and can allow for a "more durable foundation" of knowledge. Hume spoke of the inconsistencies and inadequacies of religion. These were dangerous things to talk about, but his treatises seemed to set the stage for a cacophony of voices to speak against tradition.

Immanuel Kant followed on the heels of David Hume. In 1794 he wrote Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Kant believed that religion within the limits of reason alone could not provide an adequate portrayal of the supernatural, "simply because in this realm all use of reason ceases." This doesn’t mean Kant did not believe in God, just that he felt that true knowledge of God could not be attained through reason. Religion, however, was a different issue. Kant believed that religion, created by man, and likewise scripture, could and should be unified with reason. "For a religion which rashly declares war on reason will not be able to hold out in the long run against it." In his second preface to his work Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant laid out his goal. "if [this paper] is successful, we shall be able to say that reason can be found to be not only compatible with scripture but also at one with it, so that he who follows one will not fail to conform to the other." Kant successfully took apart religion as the way to reveal God just as Hume did. Between Hume and Kant, the traditional theistic proofs were taken apart. For Kant, reason and religion walk hand in hand. Both, however, are inadequate means by which to reveal God. Reason seemed to have wiped any hope for a logical proof of the existence of God.

In the midst of tearing down God in the late Renaissance and early modern philosophical circles, there lurked some that maintained God is alive and doing quite well. Soren Kierkegaard, in the mid 19^th century, claimed that to believe in God there needs to be a leap of faith. Kierkegaard sought to answer the question; "Can the truth be learned?" For him, rational thought existed as a paradox when it came to matters of faith. "This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think." Kierkegaard believed that it is a difficult matter to want to demonstrate that something, anything, exists. He argued for God’s existence by "never reason[ing] in conclusion to existence but…in conclusion from existence." He claimed that there is an absolute relation between God and his works and that God’s essence entails God’s existence. In order for him to make this move, he must accept that God exists first and then attempt to prove it by reason. "By beginning, then I have presupposed the ideality, have presupposed that I will succeed in accomplishing it, but what else is that but presupposing that the god exists and actually beginning with trust in him." This is a fideistic move for Kierkegaard. He first has faith and then seeks rational support. Kierkegaard accepted faith alone for seeking truth in the deity, but not reason alone. "A qualification that claims to render the god directly knowable is undoubtedly an approximation milestone." Reason can only support faith in these matters and never replace it.

In the modern and contemporary world of philosophy we are left with a gap. A split between the rational thinkers and the religious believers has formed. One contemporary philosopher, Charles Hartshorne, has made a bold move to speak about God in a non-religious and philosophical scenario. If anyone in this present time speaks of God it is often categorized as religion and not philosophy. This is perhaps the greatest symbol of the gap between faith and reason. Hartshorne has attempted to close this gap. In the preface of "A Natural Theology for our Time," He writes:

A new day seems to be dawning in religious thought, which for several centuries has been struggling to free itself from the intellectual chains in which Aristotelian and so-called Platonic or neo-Platonic influences have long held it confined. Some bad guesses of early secular reason, often accepted by theology as part of its own message, have been increasingly subject to criticism, both theological and philosophical. From now on, the religious idea may at last have a good chance to be judged on its merits, not on those of a spurious substitute. The philosophical ‘absolute’- which Barth correctly terms a ‘pagan’ idea- can no longer pose unchallenged as the Worshipful One of religion. At the same time, it begins to appear that the God of religion is in a sense more absolute than most philosophers have been prepared to admit, or most theologians to claim. For, as Anselm tried, but in part failed, to convey to scholars, the mere eternal existence of God is, as Plato said of his Good, ‘above being’ – in the usual form of contingent existence. From this it follows that ‘empirical’ arguments for or against the divine existence are logical monstrosities.

Hartshorne has reintroduced reason and logical thought as a means to reveal the deity. Empirical proof is no way to reveal truth about God, but Hartshorne believes that logical reasoning can lead us there. The important thing about Hartshorne’s work is not that he shows that God exists, but that he uses reason to explain something that has come to be considered the realm of faith and religion. Hartshorne maintains that the impossibility of proof has not been established. The mistakes of past philosophers such as Hume and Kant have led us away from formal argument in natural theology. Their mistake is simple. Hartshorne argues, "Suppose P entails Q. Then those who initially accept P must either accept Q also, or reconsider their acceptance of P." Proof entails God’s existence. The mistake comes when wanting to reject Q, God’s existence, philosophers reject all P. Hartshorne believes there are proofs that do substantiate God’s existence. "It is very clear to me that I should not have been a theist all these years had I not found the Ps which I take to entail this Q to be such that their denial is for me much more clearly counterintuitive than the simple rejection of Q." Hartshorne believes in God, but finds that empirical reasoning just simply is not enough to establish God’s existence. "The bare question of God’s existence is purely nonempirical." He also feels that there is something irrational in choosing not to believe in God. Charles Hartshorne has set out to show that a belief in God, based first on some basic acceptance of God’s existence, can be rationally supported through logical reasoning though not necessarily empirical reasoning. I find his efforts to be successful for he has brought back into scrutiny the possibility of rationally thinking about God at an intellectual level. Too many centuries have passed without this exercise.

As the Middle Ages progressed, so did the split between faith and reason. Things started out with no apparent conflict, faith and reason coexisted nicely. This is because reason was used to support faith in religious beliefs. It wasn’t until philosophers slowly began to deconstruct certain basic tenets of the Christian Faith that reason began to be seen as something in opposition to faith. Incredible thinkers such as Hume and Kant used their capacities for reason to take apart the traditional Western views of religion held for so long. This relatively new concept grew strongly and soon became the dominant voice in philosophy. As mainstream thought has drifted slowly away from any sort of religious belief, a handful of philosophers have maintained a quiet but steady voice for the credibility of religious belief. Kierkegaard in the 19^th century and Charles Hartshorne in the current century are two examples. They, and others in their circles, have brought back the viability of reason supporting religious belief. Religion for them is not just an endeavor of faith, but one that can be backed by reason. Fideism, the moderate view, has come back to the contemporary scene of philosophy. Philosophers are recognizing the possibility of knowledge of religious belief supportable by reason and rational thought.

In this chapter, I have detailed the historical roots of fideism and the growing gap between faith and reason. I have shown a beginning of a peaceful coexistence of the two in the Middle Ages, followed by a deep and growing split. In the contemporary and modern era, a possibility of a reunification of faith and reason has emerged with the concepts introduced by new thinkers. The Moderate Fideistic standpoint is being voiced anew. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the possibility of a reconciliation of faith and reason and I will show how rational thought can help stabilize a foundation of religious belief built upon faith.

In the last chapter, I showed how faith and reason in the Middle Ages seemed to coexist without problem. As modern times came to be, a gap formed between the two and reason and faith became opposites. Certain things that used to exist in the scientific realm, when shown not to be rational, began to exist in the religious realm. Beliefs became categorized. The current trend seems to be that if a belief is reasonably justifiable, it is a scientific belief. If a belief is justifiable by faith, it is religious. Thus religious belief, because it is justified by faith, has been thought to not equate to or lead to knowledge. In chapter one I showed how faith can lead to knowledge by the faith transitive principle of epistemology. I believe that religious belief can deal with the realm of true knowledge. It is because of this principle that I defend a moderate view of fideism and eliminate the extreme view.

If it can be conceded that faith justifies religious belief, as I have shown in Chapter Two, and if the exercise begun in Chapter One, that shows that faith can be rationally explained as a justification for knowledge, is not accepted, the moderate fideist will claim that nothing is lost. Nothing is lost because faith is all that is necessary for the justification of religious belief. If no rational support is found, then faith still exists and so does the belief. If the arguments of Chapter One are accepted, then faith in religious belief has found rational support and the belief rests upon a more durable foundation. Either case is acceptable for the fideist. This is the point of my paper. I must concede a weakness in the theory however. If that which I have faith in is shown to be false by empirical evidence, then it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain a justification that the belief in which I have faith in is still true. For example, if I have faith in a belief that a substance called phlogiston exists, and by empirical evidence it is shown that it is clear that there is no such substance as phlogiston, then I must abandon my faith in that belief as true since it has been shown to be false. Having said that, I claim that I will maintain my faith in the belief that God exists until it can be shown that God does not exist. If rational support follows for my decision, then so be it; my faith has found more solid ground. If no rational support can be found, I lose nothing. The only thing that can damage my faith in God is empirical proof that God does not exist. I believe the likelihood of such evidence is slim, but as a moderate fideist, I am not completely opposed to the possibility.

What are the logical implications of fideism? For an extreme fideist, all logic is abandoned. This is irrational, and purposefully so. As a philosopher interested in seeking the truth, I cannot accept extreme fideism. The moderate fideist allows for the possibility of rational support, even if there is a minimal possibility that the concept that the moderate fideist holds has any rational support. The possibility cannot be overlooked, no matter how remote. As one who seeks truth will agree, all possibilities must be explored. I therefore support the efforts of the moderate fideists.

Why would one subscribe to moderate fideism? There are certain concepts that exist that are difficult to provide rational proof for. It is equally difficult to provide rational proof for the nonexistence of these concepts. For reasons that differ and are relative to individuals, people need or want to believe that certain concepts are true. In the absence of rational, logical proof, the only way one can accept these concepts is by a leap of faith. It would be tragic if those who make this leap would abandon all attempts at finding rational support. Empirical evidence could show that the belief held has no possibility of being true. If that person would maintain that belief in the face of evidence against it being true, then that person would indeed be foolish. Blind faith is a dangerous creature. However, that same person, accepting her belief as true and allowing for the seeking of rational support of her belief, is more justified in maintaining her belief. If empirical evidence were provided to show that the belief held was impossible to be true, then the moderate fideist, in accepting rational thought, would be forced to give up that belief. If no rational support is provided for the truth or non-truth of a particular belief, then the moderate fideist is justified in maintaining her belief.

When it comes to accepting the existence of God, there are two possibilities, extreme fideism or moderate fideism. One either accepts that God exists and abandons all rational support or lack thereof, or one accepts that God exists and allows for the possibility of rational support. It is the extreme fideist who can be dangerous. Those who accept God on the basis of blind faith can be (and have been in the past) responsible for religious wars, exiles, execution of ‘heretics’ and worse. There exist in this world intellectual people who want to accept that God exists but are disillusioned by those who base their faith solely on faith itself. Unfortunately in the Western world, most religions and denominations of religions are based on some sort of blind faith. Religious belief that is based first on faith and allows for the seeking of rational support is more solid, foundational and is much more fulfilling for the intellectual thinker.

This paper has been an endeavor to find a place for the rational faithful in the adverse world that religious belief has found itself to reside in. Rational thought has been used in arguments against the existence of God for many years. Because there is no empirical proof for God’s existence, many philosophers have excluded the possibility. This is a terrifically narrow-minded point of view. For human beings, proof must always come with empirical evidence. That which we cannot ‘see’ must not exist. This is an arrogant disposition that has hindered humanity for centuries. There are things of this universe that exist in ways which human beings may never understand. To think that humanity can figure out all the intricacies of the universe is to place humanity on a level of the creator of the universe. This is the height of hubris. I have attempted to show that using our limited capacities of logic and reason, human beings do not always arrive at true knowledge. I have shown that faith in a foundational belief, such as God exists, can lead to knowledge that God does exist. Philosophers throughout the ages have argued this issue. Today, if moderate fideism is accepted, the issue can be laid to rest. All that we place our faith in, all that we believe in, need not be empirically verified or rationally justified for it to be sufficiently justified to us. Even empirical evidence to the contrary can be doubted, and should be doubted, if ultimate truth is to be found. Even so, we must not forget that what we do know to be true is based upon certain guidelines of deduction and scientific research, logical rationalizations and rigorous argumentations. These methods of discovering truth have brought humanity far. If these methods can be applied to those things in which we have no apparent empirical evidence for believing in, then perhaps they should be. For in the darkness of no empirical evidence there can shine a light of truth through rationalization. If my faith lies solely on faith itself, and there seems to be no empirical form of support for what I believe in, and I have an opportunity to support my faith with a reliable exercise of logic and rational thought, then I must exclaim "let there be light!"

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition.

(f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith’s evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-names quite at random, and constructs the following three propositions:

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

(h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona;

1. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realized the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does not own a Ford, but is a present driving a rented car. And second, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.

http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/rbbr/toc.html

Mark 4:11-13

He told them, 'The secret of the kingdom of God has been given to you. But to those on the outside everything is said in parables so that,
They may be ever seeing but never perceiving,
and ever hearing but never understanding;
otherwise they might turn and be forgiven!'

Then Jesus said to them, 'Don't you understand this parable? How then will you understand any parable?

-My insight:

This excerpt form Mark may be the most profound verse in the entire Bible, and the one that reveals the most truth. I believe it may be partially misquoted.

This ironic verse depicts Jesus explaining to his disciples not to take the Parables he tells literally because they are a metaphor for a spiritual truth that cannot be directly explained. Ask yourself, Is the story of Christ, the resurrection, God the Father, and all the beautiful images of Christianity in and of themselves a metaphor for the spirituality that exists within each of us but cannot be explicitly expressed?